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Several market failures, as well as other technical, economic and regulatory barriers to the market 
penetration of clean energy technologies result in under-investment of private innovators in RD&D. 
Therefore, public support is needed in order to induce innovations. Policy tools creating market 
conditions that are attractive for the exploitation of clean technologies (market pull) must be combined 
with other tools directly supporting the development of these technologies through the provision of 
public funds (technology push). Thereby, financing policy instruments should be chosen so that their 
characteristics match with those of the specific innovation process being targeted at the same time that 
social welfare is maximized. We develop an analytical framework to define the form of public support 
and to provide recommendations on the optimal choice of both technology push and market pull 
instruments. 
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In order to stabilize the concentration of greenhouse gases in the atmosphere and to reach the EU 
climate objectives, a portfolio of low-carbon energy technologies has to be employed at a large scale 
and investments enhancing energy efficiency have to be undertaken. This requires substantial 
activities in research, development and demonstration (RD&D) targeting the development of new 
technologies as well as achieving capacity cost reductions for existing clean technologies in order to 
make them competitive compared to traditional fossil fuel based options (see also EC, 2009).  
Market failures, as well as other technical, economic and regulatory barriers to the market 
penetration of clean technologies result in under-investment of private innovators in RD&D. In the 
absence of any public support, this is likely to lead to a situation where the level and timing of 
investments are suboptimal from a social point of view. Traditionally, technology innovation experts 
have discussed the choice between Technology Push (TP) instruments directly supporting the 
development of new technologies through the provision of public funds, and Market Pull (MP) 
instruments aimed at creating conditions in the market that are attractive for the exploitation of clean 
technologies by private parties. As industry experts already have argued (see e.g. Foxon, 2003), TP 
and MP instruments are complementary means and should be combined depending on the features of 
each technology. This article shows that:  
1 // Market Pull instruments are needed to improve and drive down the cost of clean technologies 
that are already available but are not mature enough, as well as to encourage their use (see also 
Grubb, 2004); 
2 // Public funds must be provided, too, if clean energy innovation projects that are socially 
valuable but not commercially attractive are to be undertaken; 
3 // Specific instruments, or policy tools, to support each technology must be chosen so that the 
characteristics of these tools match those of the specific innovation process being targeted.  
After discussing the need to apply both Market Pull and Technology Push instruments, we aim to 
guide the choice of the specific policy tools of both types to implement according to the type of clean 
energy innovation to support. When designing the policy supporting the development of clean 
technologies, authorities must aim to maximize the social benefits produced by these technologies. 
This must be the overarching principle guiding public policy action and will be repeatedly referred to 
throughout the article. 
The rationale for the provision of public support to clean energy innovation is provided in Section 
2. Section 3 presents the overall framework used to choose the form of this support (policy tools to 
apply). The application of Market Pull instruments is discussed in Section 4. That of Technology Push 
instruments is discussed in Sections 5 and 6 with Section 5 focusing on the determination of the public 
financing needs of each innovation process according to its type and Section 6 on the selection of TP 
instruments to apply to support this innovation process, i.e. in order to cover the financing needs at 
lowest cost. Finally, Section 7 concludes. 
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industry representatives for their useful comments on an earlier draft of this paper. The analysis and conclusions are the 
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2 Rationale for public support 
The level of public involvement in the development of new technologies should be kept as low as 
possible since the private sector is believed to be best suited to manage risks and to identify those 
investment options with the highest potential. However, there is ample evidence that achieving an 
optimal development of clean energy technologies requires some public support. 
Existing market failures prevent clean energy innovators to capture the marginal benefits produced 
by the availability of clean technologies. First, the absence of a credible and appropriate carbon price 
(see e.g. Aghion et al., 2009) results in the inability to correct the positive externality resulting from 
clean technologies mitigating CO2 emissions. If clean energy innovators’ revenues are not in 
accordance with the marginal environmental benefits brought about by the development of clean 
technologies (i.e. social spillover), their investments in clean energy RD&D are sub-optimal. Second, 
the ability of market agents to profit from an innovation by a competitor creates a spillover of the 
benefits of the corresponding technology over the market, thus again leading to weak private 
incentives for clean energy innovation investments. This may be corrected by arranging regulating the 
access to this technology by market agents. Third, some clean technologies may benefit others that 
need the former to operate. The availability of these clean technologies creates a network spillover of 
their benefits that innovators should be compensated for in order not to weaken their investment 
incentives. Market failures of these three types, which lead to social, market and network spillovers, 
may be corrected through the use of policy instruments
2. 
Overcoming certain technical barriers to the penetration of the market by clean energy technologies 
requires achieving the massive production and use of these technologies (the so called learning by 
doing). In order to reach EU climate policy goals, a further development and deployment of low-
carbon technologies is necessary. However, market agents shall not massively install and use new 
clean technologies that are still not cost competitive unless their use is publicly supported. Policy 
instruments aimed at correcting spillovers and supporting the demand for new technologies (i.e. 
Market Pull (MP) instruments) should help trigger private innovation while not involving the direct 
provision of public funds. 
Contrary to what happens in other fields such as pharmacy, MP instruments may be unable or 
unsuitable to completely correct existing market failures affecting clean energy technologies
3. 
Additionally, there are further barriers to the development of clean energy technologies that are not 
(completely) addressed by MP instruments
4. Thus, for example, innovations in clean energy 
technologies often pair very high capital requirements with substantial technical, economic and 
regulatory uncertainties hampering the involvement of the private sector. Besides other relevant 
barriers, economies of scale favor a lock-in impeding the market entry of new technologies
5. 
As a consequence, a gap between the cost of financing the development of a clean energy 
technology and the funds that private parties are willing to contribute is likely to remain once MP 
instruments have been put in place. The size of this financing gap depends on the cash flow of the 
concerned innovation process and can be determined by carrying out the same cost-benefit analysis 
conducted by innovators whereby they decide whether to undertake this process. Public funds must be 
                                                      
2  Different market failures to (low-carbon) innovation are also discussed in Martin and Scott (2000) and Foxon (2003). For 
an overview on theoretical analysis of the effects of environmental policy on technological change see Jaffe et al. (2002).  
3  See the discussion on the management of intellectual property in Section 4. 
4  A comprehensive discussion of the barriers to innovation in clean energy technologies is provided in Neuhoff (2007). 
5  For a detailed discussion on the funding gap in the financing of R&D and innovation originating in imperfections of 
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directly mobilized to cover the financing gap of clean energy innovation processes that MP 
instruments are unable to cover. This involves the application of Technology Push (TP) instruments.  
3 General analytical framework 
In order to be effective, the type and amount of public support to be provided to an innovation process 
must be conditioned by the characteristics of the concerned technology and its stage of development. 
Additionally, authorities must aim to maximize the overall increase in social welfare resulting from 
the support of this and other clean innovation processes.  
We propose a methodology to be used to choose financing policy instruments in order to support 
RD&D investments in clean energy innovations. This methodology can be deemed to be divided into 
three steps. First, one must characterize the concerned innovation process in terms of variables that are 
related to the type of technology to be developed and its maturity. Second, the type of public support 
that this process requires must be defined based on the characteristics of the latter. Finally, taking into 
account the type of support needed by this process and the objective to maximize the overall social 
benefit of clean energy innovation, the characteristics of the support instruments to use must be 
determined and the specific instruments that best match these characteristics must be identified. The 
identification of the instruments to be used to support a generic innovation process is illustrated in 
Figure 1. 
Figure 1: General analytical framework 
 
4 Market pull instruments 
Each of the three steps to be taken to select MP instruments that should support an innovation process 
is addressed in a separate subsection. 
4.1 Main features of an innovation process relevant to the choice of MP instruments to apply  
The main features of an innovation process to be considered when determining the type of indirect 
support it needs (i.e. MP instruments to be applied) are related to the characteristics of the concerned 
technology and its level of maturity. These features include the following: 
» Stage of development of the technology: The level of maturity of a technology conditions the 
timing of revenues and expenses resulting from its development. Additionally, the level of maturity of 
this technology relative to that of alternative clean technologies potentially competing with the former 
may significantly condition the type of support to be provided. Support to be received by mature 
technologies may promote competition among them while support to immature technologies must be 
more specific.  
»  Interdependence between this technology and other new technologies: The fact that the 
concerned technology is dependent on other new energy technologies, or other new technologies are 
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dependent on the former, shall condition the potential level of deployment of one and the others. This 
will in turn condition the level and type of support needed by an innovation process. 
» Type of knowledge acquired through innovation: meaning whether this innovation represents an 
incremental knowledge advance or a breakthrough.  
» Structure of the demand for this technology: The relative weight of the private and public sectors 
as potential consumers of the concerned technology conditions the potential of the public sector to 
drive the development of the market for this technology. 
4.2 Identification of the type of indirect support needed by an innovation process 
MP instruments are used to provide indirect support to an innovation process through the creation of 
market conditions that are more advantageous for the innovator. One cannot neglect the fact that 
market conditions where the exploitation of a technology shall take place affect the commercial 
viability of this technology and therefore have a direct impact on the needs for direct public support. A 
distinction is made between indirect support provided to correct existing spillovers and the support to 
the development of the market for the considered technology. 
4.2.1 Support needed for the correction of spillovers 
The type of support needed to deal with the spillover of the benefits of innovation depends on the type 
of existing spillovers and whether correcting these spillovers, or compensating the innovator for them, 
is possible and desirable. The capability of authorities to correct a spillover and the advisability to do 
so depend, in turn, on the type of spillover considered. Thus, the support to be provided for the 
correction of spillovers is discussed separately for each type of spillover.  
» Social spillover: Clean energy technologies involve a reduction in CO2 emissions and therefore 
give raise to social spillovers. This environmental externality should be addressed through the 
implementation of a carbon pricing scheme. The correction of this externality is always desirable. 
Applying a price to CO2 emissions plays a central role in achieving the objectives of climate policies 
by increasing the commercial appeal of these technologies.  
»  Network spillover: This spillover exists when other new technologies are dependent on the 
considered one or the market value of the former increases due to the availability of the latter. 
Network spillovers can and should always be corrected through the regulation of the revenues earned 
by those entities exploiting the corresponding technology. This will encourage the use of new 
technologies developed.  
»  Market spillover: Market spillovers are present for most technologies, since part of the 
knowledge produced by the development of a new technology can be appropriated by competitors 
though backward engineering. It can be corrected more easily the more different this technology is 
from others existing in the market, since detecting a breach of property rights is easier when the 
technology that is being copied can be clearly distinguished from any other. Thus, protecting radical 
innovations from market spillovers tends to be possible, while protecting incremental innovations is 
much more difficult. Tightening intellectual property rights, which could be claimed by those private 
parties contributing funds to innovation, could nevertheless endanger the spread of clean technologies. 
4.2.2 Support needed to increase the demand of the concerned technology 
This support is aimed at facilitating the massive production and use of a clean technology in order to 
gain the knowledge required to overcome existing technical barriers as well as to accelerate the 
replacement of damaging fossil fuel technologies. Now, we discuss those features of a clean 
technology that determine the type of support this technology requires to increase its installed capacity Public Support for the Financing of RD&D Activities in New Clean Energy Technologies 
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and use. We also show how features discussed here depend, in turn, on those previously identified in 
Section 4.1: 
» Ability of the public sector to pull the demand for the considered technology: This depends on the 
structure of the potential demand for this technology (relative weight of the public and private sectors 
as consumers). If the public sector is a potential large consumer of this technology, policies to increase 
the demand for this technology could focus on this sector.  
» Capacity of this technology to compete with others: This depends on the level of maturity of the 
concerned technology. If the concerned technology is less mature than other new clean technologies, 
the demand for all these technologies cannot be jointly supported because technology consumers 
would make use of the more mature ones.  
» Likelihood that the support for this technology must be cut off: This depends on the stage of 
innovation addressed or level of maturity of the concerned technology. The less mature a technology 
is, the more probable it is that technologies finally chosen to be massively deployed are others rather 
than the former. If support for a technology may likely need to be cut off in the future, this support 
should not be committed for a long time or lead to a situation where authorities are locked into funding 
this technology.  
» Reliability of the considered technology: This depends on the level of maturity of the technology. 
More mature technologies tend to be more reliable. The reliability of a technology should condition 
whether to support its installation or use. The development of an already reliable technology can 
generally not be accelerated by increasing the use of this technology. Then, public support to this 
technology should reward its installation, thus avoiding the interference of public support with market 
prices. As for unreliable technologies, rewarding their use would encourage innovators to overcome 
the reliability barriers it faces while, at the same time, increasing uncertainty about the level of support 
they will receive
6. Support provided by schemes rewarding the installation of unreliable technologies 
would be predictable but would not encourage the innovator to overcome existing reliability barriers. 
Then, unreliable technologies could be supported both rewarding their use and their installation. 
4.3 Selection of Market Pull instruments  
Here, we discuss the situations where different MP instruments should be used. MP instruments aimed 
at correcting spillovers are discussed separately from those supporting the demand for the concerned 
technology. 
4.3.1 Selection of instruments correcting spillovers 
Criteria to be used for the assessment of the application of instruments 
Policy instruments should be applied to avoid, or compensate technology innovators or users for, those 
existing spillovers that can and should be corrected. Within the range of policy options that are able to 
correct these spillovers, authorities should choose the instrument to apply based on the impact of each 
of these instruments on social welfare. Arguments on the impact on welfare of different policy 
instruments are beyond the scope of this article. Welfare maximizing arguments relevant for 
environmental externalities can be found in Cropper and Oates (1992) or Grubb et al. (2007). 
Arguments on the use of policy tools to correct market spillovers (mainly patents) are provided in 
Jaumotte and Pain (2005). Joode et al. (2007) discuss several implications of the use of policy 
instruments to correct network spillovers.  
                                                      
6  Under a support scheme rewarding the use of an unreliable technology, the amount of public funds to be received would 
depend on the innovators’ ability to overcome existing reliability barriers.  Luis Olmos, Sophia Ruester, Siok Jen Liong, Jean-Michel Glachant 
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Assessment of the use of specific available instruments 
Instruments aimed at addressing different types of spillovers are discussed separately: 
» Social spillovers: Financing policy instruments targeted at correcting social spillovers (in the case 
of clean energy technologies, environmental externalities) include the establishment of a carbon price, 
via the use of a carbon tax or a cap-and-trade mechanism, or the use of a white certificate scheme. 
Carbon prices are aimed at supporting both clean generation and energy efficient technologies while 
white certificates are specifically aimed to support energy efficient technologies.  
» Market spillovers: Policy instruments targeted at correcting market spillovers mainly involve the 
implementation of enforceable property rights over the production and use of new technologies or over 
the knowledge needed to produce and use them (patents). These instruments should only be applied 
when correcting existing market spillovers is possible and desirable. As explained in Section 4.2.1, 
patents can only avoid market spillovers when the knowledge they refer to can be clearly distinguished 
from that produced elsewhere. In other words, they would be most effective to protect radical 
innovation or knowledge produced in the first stages of the innovation chain (basic research). There is 
a trade-off between providing incentives to invest in innovation via intellectual property (IP) 
protection and achieving a faster spread of clean energy technologies, especially in developing 
countries, via open access to knowledge. Exclusive rights to knowledge produced in innovation should 
not block the spread of this innovation. However, the use of these rights, though limited, may probably 
be needed to trigger the participation of the private sector in clean RD&D, especially in the case of 
small innovators. 
» Network spillovers: Instruments addressing network spillovers of a technology must compensate 
users of this technology for the benefits that it renders to the users of other technologies. Thus, a 
regulated remuneration scheme is adopted for companies using technologies that produce network 
spillovers. Rate of return remuneration schemes, which guarantee a reasonable rate of return on 
investments, are applied to compensate for the use of not cost competitive technologies. Incentive-
based remuneration schemes (price cap, revenue cap) set extra incentives for companies to reduce 
expenditures. Therefore, they are well adapted to reward the use of mature, cost competitive, 
technologies. 
4.3.2 Selection of instruments supporting the demand for a new technology 
Criteria to be used for the assessment of the application of instruments 
Whenever the public sector is a potential large consumer of a technology, support policies should only 
affect it, thus avoiding the interference of this support with the functioning of the rest of the market. 
Besides, clean technologies that are mature enough to be deployed but not cost competitive 
compared to alternative clean options should be supported separately from the latter. On the other 
hand, the demand for all those clean technologies that are mature enough to compete with alternative 
clean options should be jointly supported. This would create a competitive pressure that should drive 
down their cost. 
The demand for technologies that are unlikely to be winners, and therefore to be massively 
deployed, should be supported through instruments that do not create long term support commitments 
and do not lead to authorities being locked into this support. On the other hand, the demand for clean 
technologies that most probably will be massively deployed (though they still have to go some way 
down the cost curve) should be supported through instruments providing more stable investment 
signals even when they also create long term support commitments. 
Finally, when choosing which instruments to apply, authorities should also consider the suitability 
of each of them to back a technology based on the level of reliability of the latter. Aspects to be taken 
into account in this regard include the incentives provided by each instrument to overcome reliability Public Support for the Financing of RD&D Activities in New Clean Energy Technologies 
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barriers, the level of certainty provided by this instrument over the amount of support provided and the 
level of interference of the instrument with the functioning of the market (prices). 
Assessment of the use of specific available instruments 
Main types of instruments aimed at supporting the demand for a technology include those that support 
the investment in capacity of this new technology; those that support the current use of this technology 
and those that directly enforce the use of this new technology. The application of each of these types 
of instruments is assessed next according to the criteria already identified. 
(a) Instruments financially supporting the current installation of capacity of a new technology  
These instruments typically involve the application of capacity payments to generation companies, 
transmission and distribution system operators.  These instruments do not create long term 
commitments to support the installation of capacity not yet built (the level and target of support 
payments can be regularly updated). However, payments affecting already installed capacity cannot be 
abolished or changed. The level of flexibility of these instruments can be deemed relatively high. 
Capacity payments are both able to target specific technical options or promote competition among 
technologies, since their level can be separately set for each technology or a common level can be 
applied. These payments are aimed to encourage the use of the corresponding technology in the 
private sector. Applying capacity payments to support the use of this technology in the public sector 
would amount to creating a cross subsidy between different units or departments of the public 
administration. Then, these instruments should not support the demand for technologies mainly used 
in the public sector. 
Finally, these instruments do not interfere with all the functioning of the market, i.e. they do not 
alter directly market prices (see also Newbery, 2010). Thus, capacity payments are well suited to 
support the deployment of reliable technologies, whose output does not need to be rewarded. They 
may also be used to support the deployment of unreliable ones because capacity payments provide 
stable investment incentives even when they do not encourage innovators to overcome reliability 
barriers. 
To sum up, arguments exist to apply capacity payments to support the demand for both mature 
technologies that can compete with clean alternatives, or are even winning technologies, and immature 
technologies.  
(b) Instruments financially supporting the current use (output) of a new technology  
These instruments can be classified according to the stage of the electricity value chain where this 
technology is employed:  
» Electricity generation technologies: here, a distinction is made between price-based and 
production-quota-based instruments. Price-based instruments (feed-in-tariffs, market premiums) 
provide a long term commitment to support the use of already existing capacity but not the use of that 
capacity yet to be installed. They are able to target each technology separately or jointly support 
several technologies and are not well suited to support the use of a technology in the public sector. 
Therefore, in this regard they exhibit the same characteristics as capacity payments. However, unlike 
capacity payments, they encourage innovators to overcome the existing reliability barriers of the 
concerned technology at the expense of interfering with market prices. Then, these instruments might 
be used, either to support the demand for not yet reliable clean generation technologies, or to 
accelerate the deployment of already mature technologies. If technologies supported can compete 
among themselves, the level of support payments should be common to all of them. Finally, the 
demand for the technologies supported should not mainly come from the public sector. 
Production quota based instruments (e.g. a minimum share of renewables in electricity production) 
are aimed at creating competition among different clean technologies. Thus, the targeting of a specific Luis Olmos, Sophia Ruester, Siok Jen Liong, Jean-Michel Glachant 
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technology is typically not possible. If these instruments are meant to influence the investment 
behavior or companies, they should provide stable signals and therefore a long term commitment. 
However, quota instruments provide flexibility regarding the technologies to be used to comply with 
this commitment (which, as already mentioned, affects several clean technologies competing among 
themselves). These instruments can be designed to only affect the demand for a certain group of 
technologies in the public sector. They might be used to encourage innovators to overcome reliability 
problems but interfere with market prices. Production quota based instruments are, in principle, best 
suited to support clean generation technologies that are mature enough to compete against other clean 
options and whose demand may or may not mainly come from the public sector. 
» Network technologies: The remuneration scheme applied to reward the installation or use of 
transmission and distribution clean technologies can support the development of demand for these 
technologies. As already mentioned above, rate-of-return regulation is best suited to support the 
demand for reliable but not cost competitive technologies (though they could also support the demand 
for unreliable ones) while incentive-based regulation is best suited to support the demand for cost 
competitive technologies
7. Rate of return remuneration schemes involve the assessment of each 
specific investment proposal made by the network operator. Therefore, they can be used to target a 
specific technology. Rate of return schemes do not need to commit long term support to any 
technology, but investments already incurred must be remunerated. On the other hand, incentive-based 
schemes are output driven. Therefore, they cannot target any specific technology. Both types of 
schemes may be applied only to specific companies. Therefore, they can be designed to affect the 
demand for a technology or technologies only in the public sector. 
To summarize, rate of return remuneration schemes are best suited to support network technologies 
that are not cost competitive yet compared to alternative clean options while incentive based schemes 
are best used to support the demand for cost efficient technologies. Under both types of schemes, the 
technology or technologies supported may or may not be mainly consumed by the public sector. 
(c) Instruments directly enforcing the use of a new technology  
Instruments to be considered here include standard setting; niche management and long term 
requirements and obligations. 
Standards have a long lasting effect on the technologies available in the market, killing competitors 
not complying with the standard. Therefore, they can only be used to support clean technologies, or 
groups of technologies, that have proven to be superior to alternatives (winning technologies). As 
suggested, standards can refer to a specific technology or group of technologies and their application 
can be limited to a certain fraction of the potential demand for a new technology (the public sector). 
Thus, they are well suited to target winning clean technologies that may or may not be mainly 
consumed by the public sector. 
Niches provide a reduced but relevant market for a specific technology option or group of 
technologies competing among themselves (e.g. via public procurement programs). Given that they 
target a reduced market segment, support commitments provided though niche management can be 
altered more easily than those provided by standards. Then, niches should be created to support clean 
technologies that have not yet proven to be winners (they may be cost competitive or not, or even not 
yet fully reliable) and have the public sector as a major consumer.  
Finally, long term requirements and obligations determine in advance the features of technologies 
to be used in the future, or performance objectives to be met by these technologies (e.g. obligation to 
                                                      
7  A incentive-based remuneration scheme could set incentives directly related to the installation of capacity of new 
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refurbish old buildings using advanced insulation materials, micro-generation etc. before being able to 
resell them). They must be designed to provide a long-term inflexible support commitment that result 
in strong enough investment incentives. They can both be designed to target a specific technology or 
promote competition among several clean technologies. Finally, long term requirements can affect 
only the public sector or the whole potential demand for a new technology or technologies. Long term 
requirements are best suited to support technologies, or groups of technologies, that still require some 
time to become mature (they may not be reliable yet) but are deemed to be necessary in the future. 
5 Characterization of an innovation process relevant for the use of Technology Push 
instruments 
Public funds need to be mobilized to support clean energy innovation that is socially desirable but not 
commercially attractive even when MP instruments have been put in place. This section discusses the 
set of criteria that condition the type of direct financial support to be provided to an innovation 
process. These criteria are intimately linked to some basic features of innovation processes that are 
identified first.  
5.1 Main features of an innovation process relevant to the choice of TP instruments  
The characteristics and stage of development of a clean technology condition the type of direct 
financial support needed. Most of the features to be considered have already been discussed when 
analyzing the use of MP instruments and will therefore only be mentioned here. These are the stage of 
development of the technology, the dependence of this technology on other new technologies, and the 
type of knowledge acquired though innovation (i.e. radical vs. incremental innovation). Additionally, 
the level of costs incurred in the innovation process addressed is also relevant to define the type of 
direct support to be provided, since it conditions the amount of public funds to be provided in order to 
engage innovators in this process. The level of costs incurred in an innovation process depends both 
on the type of technology and the stage of innovation addressed. 
5.2 Identification of the type of direct support needed by an innovation process 
Based on the features of an innovation process just identified, we discuss the set of criteria that 
determine the type of direct financial support required by this innovation process:  
» Size of the financing gap: In order for an innovation process to be carried out, the gap between 
the costs to be incurred in this process and the funds that private investors’ are willing to contribute 
once the appropriate MP instruments have been put in place must be covered using public funds. The 
size of the gap to cover can be determined by conducting the same cost-benefit analysis that potential 
private investors carry out to decide whether to undertake the corresponding innovation process. This 
cost-benefit analysis shall take into account the level of costs incurred in the innovation process; the 
level of revenues expected to be earned by any single entity from the exploitation of this technology in 
the market; the probability that this technology fails to reach the market and the timing of market 
revenues
8.  
» Targeting of the concerned technology: this is conditioned by the following two technology 
features: 
¾  Capacity of this technology to compete with others for public funds: This depends on the level of 
maturity (stage of development) of the technology. If the concerned technology is less mature than 
                                                      
8  It can be easily shown that all these variables are in turn dependent on the main features of an innovation process defined 
in Section 5.1.  Luis Olmos, Sophia Ruester, Siok Jen Liong, Jean-Michel Glachant 
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alternative clean technologies that are also to be publicly funded, the decision on which 
technologies to receive public funds cannot be left in the hands of innovators. This is due to the 
fact that the private sector has a natural incentive to invest in those technologies that are closer to 
the market and, therefore, closer to rendering market revenues. Therefore, in this case, funds 
should be directly assigned by public authorities to the concerned technology. On the other hand, 
those clean technologies that are, at least, as mature as alternative clean options should be left to 
compete for public funds, since this competitive pressure could help drive down their costs. 
¾  Likelihood that the support for this technology must be cut off: This depends on the stage of 
development of the technology to be supported as well as on whether the innovation activity to be 
carried out represents a knowledge breakthrough or an incremental increase in knowledge. The 
less likely a technology is to reach the market, the easier it should be to redirect public funds to 
supporting other technologies.  
» Type of innovating entity carrying out this process: The ability of the direct support provided to 
trigger successful innovation depends on how likely it is that this support is efficiently used by the 
type of entity deemed to carry out this innovation. The level of costs incurred in an innovation, its 
strength (radical vs. incremental) and the level of dependence of the concerned technology on other 
new technologies jointly determine which type of entity is best suited to conducting the corresponding 
innovation process. Thus, high RD&D costs can only be afforded by big entities; hence, while radical 
innovation is best carried out by small innovating entities and incremental innovation is best adapted 
to big incumbents. An innovation involving several technologies is better carried out by entities with 
cross technology expertise or through collaborative research.  
6 Selection of Technology Push instruments  
Before being able to determine which policy instruments may be used to publicly fund an innovation 
process, we need to identify the features of these instruments that are relevant to determine whether 
each instrument is well suited to provide the kind of support needed by the considered process. 
Afterwards, we assess the application of the main existing TP instruments. 
6.1 Criteria to be used for the assessment of the application of instruments  
As discussed in Section 5.2, instruments to apply to publicly fund the development of a certain 
technology should be chosen taking into account the type of support needed by this technology and the 
overall economic objective of maximizing social benefits of all the innovation conducted. Reducing 
the public cost of direct support provided to an innovation process should leave room for a larger 
number of additional promising innovation processes (a larger amount of clean energy innovation) 
publicly supported and should lead to a more efficient use of overall innovation funds available. This, 
in turn, should increase the overall social welfare. Therefore, TP instruments applied should involve 
the lowest public cost possible that is compatible with this process being undertaken. 
Based on all this, the three main criteria finally chosen to assess the application of TP instruments 
to an innovation process are (i) the ability of each instrument to fund this process at a reasonable cost; 
(ii) the targeting this instrument makes of the concerned technology and (iii) the type of innovator that 
is well suited to received support through this instrument. The ability of an instrument to fund a 
process at a reasonable cost is in turn related to the size of the funding gap that the former is able to 
cover and the public cost of applying this instrument. The targeting an instrument makes of a 
technology depends on its ability to fund a specific technical option and its flexibility in redirecting 
funds to alternative projects.  Public Support for the Financing of RD&D Activities in New Clean Energy Technologies 
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6.2 Assessment of the use of specific available instruments 
There are three general types of technology push instruments: loans/loan guarantees, those whereby 
the public administration acquires an equity share of an innovating company (Public-Private-Equity-
Partnerships, or PPEPs), and subsidies. Thereby, subsidies can be classified into three different types: 
prizes awarded to the winner of a contest to carry out a certain innovation, tax credits, or other 
benefits, granted in return for undertaking private investments in new technologies, and grants or 
contracts that are awarded ex-ante to an innovating entity or consortium and whose size may or may 
not be conditioned by performance.  
Using the set of criteria defined in this section to assess the performance of the application of TP 
instruments, we now discuss which types of innovation processes may well be financed with each of 
these policy instruments. Table 1 provides the main conclusions drawn from our analysis.  
6.2.1 Provision of public loans or publicly backed loans 
(a) Ability of this instrument to fund innovation at a reasonable cost 
» Size of the financing gap it is able to cover: Loans are less attractive to innovators than subsidies, 
since the amount of funds obtained must be paid back to the investor together with the agreed interest 
rate. Public loans are able to close the financing gap of innovation processes that are not subject to a 
significant level of risk and are expected to lead to revenues in the short-term. They can also be used 
to fund low-cost innovations that are far from the market, and therefore subject to significant risks, but 
might render high market revenues to the innovator, who should be able to appropriate part of the 
social benefits produced.  
Private lenders should also probably be willing to finance this innovation, while they are better 
suited than public authorities to manage risks. However, public loans (or loan guarantees) may 
probably have to replace private ones when capital markets are not liquid enough or when, due to 
asymmetry of information, the public administration is better informed about the risks involved in the 
innovation process and, therefore, is prepared to offer more advantageous interest rates
9.  
» Public cost: In those cases where the innovating entity is deemed to be able to pay back a loan 
with a high enough level of certainty, public loans (or loan guarantees) are the TP instrument whose 
public cost is lowest. Public guarantees for private loans, which involve the same allocation of risks as 
public loans, could have a lower public cost than public loans if the liquidity of the capital market is 
high. 
(b) Targeting of technologies by this instrument 
» Ability to target a specific technical option: Public loans or loan guarantees allow authorities to 
target a specific technology or technical option. The choice of which innovator or project company to 
give the loan to is with authorities, while loan provisions can specify the use to be made of funds 
provided.  
» Flexibility in redirecting funds to alternative projects: Loans can lead to a financing lock-in 
when, in order not to write off the funds provided to an innovating entity that is not able to pay credits 
back, public authorities keep providing further support to avoid its bankruptcy.  
                                                      
9  When public loans are provided at an interest rate lower than the one reflecting the inherent project risk, the public sector 
is actually partially subsidizing this innovation. The NPV of public funds provided in this case exceeds that of the 
payback if a fair interest rate is employed in the computation. This situation may occur in innovation projects where 
market interest rates available exceed the maximum financing cost that is acceptable from the innovator’s perspective.   Luis Olmos, Sophia Ruester, Siok Jen Liong, Jean-Michel Glachant 
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(c) Type of innovating entity to receive this kind of support  
Public loans or guarantees are best suited to large innovating entities whose financial capability is 
proven or to small innovating entities undertaking low-risk, low-cost innovation. 
Main conclusion 
Loans are well suited to financing low risk innovation processes that are expected to yield revenues in 
the short-term or high risk low cost innovation carried out by large companies that can appropriate a 
significant fraction of the social benefits that the former produces. Public loans should be used instead 
of private ones if the liquidity of the capital market is too low or if public authorities are better 
prepared than the private sector to assess the revenues, costs and risks involved in the concerned 
innovation process. This may be the case of innovation processes related to activities where the public 
sector is very important (e.g. RD&D in nuclear). Loans can be provided both by MS and the EU. 
6.2.2 Provision of publicly owned equity (PPEPs) 
(a) Ability of this instrument to fund innovation at a reasonable cost 
» Size of the financing gap it is able to cover: Obtaining a unit of equity financing is deemed to be less 
profitable to innovators than the same amount of subsidies. This is due to the fact that external equity 
financing (including public equity) entails a reduction in the revenues obtained by the innovator from 
the process undertaken, since these revenues must be shared between equity holders. 
On the other hand, equity may be more successful than loans in closing the funding gap of risky 
innovation processes undertaken by small companies. Contrary to public loans, issuing equity does not 
create financial distress in small innovating companies, since payments from the company to investors 
are contingent on the success of the innovation. Apart from this, investments in the equity of small 
companies would provide the latter with the collateral they need to obtain further debt-based funds. 
Finally, public equity investments could allow the administration, together with potential private 
equity investors, to provide certain expertise to small innovators, which can increase the ability of the 
latter to succeed in the innovation process and may therefore also help to close the existing financing 
gap. These and other arguments on the use of equity financing in small innovating entities are 
discussed in Carpenter and Petersen (2002). 
Big innovating entities may be better served with loans than with publicly owned equity, since the 
diminishing effect of the former on the revenues from the innovation process is bundled.  
» Public cost: Revenues from an innovation process are normally shared among equity owners 
proportionately to equity shares. This allows the public investor to benefit from the revenues resulting 
from successful RD&D activities. These funds could be used to finance further innovation
10. All this 
taken together implies that the public cost of the acquisition of equity shares is lower than that of the 
provision of the same amount of grants. On the other hand, given the risky nature of innovation 
activity and the lack of ability of authorities to identify winning technologies, participating in the 
equity of innovating entities is deemed to be more expensive from a public point of view than 
providing these entities with public loans. 
                                                      
10  In order to make the innovation process more attractive for private equity or debt investors, public equity investments 
could be subject to special conditions in terms of the allocation of revenues from the innovation process. Public Support for the Financing of RD&D Activities in New Clean Energy Technologies 
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(b) Targeting of technologies by this instrument  
» Ability to target a specific technical option: Equity investments allow authorities to choose which 
innovation processes to back. By choosing which RD&D activities to support, authorities undermine 
competition among technologies or technical solutions, but at the same time are able to push the 
undertaking of socially valuable innovation processes that are not commercially appealing. 
» Flexibility in redirecting funds to alternative projects: By providing certain expertise and being 
able to influence the decisions made by the managers of an innovating entity, public authorities buying 
equity of this entity have some control over the target of the innovation activity within the company. 
Therefore, they could contribute to a reallocation of funds within the company as more knowledge is 
gained about the potential of alternative technical options or in response to a change in market 
conditions, thus partially avoiding locking authorities into funding innovation activity that is not 
believed to deliver the initially expected results. Therefore, provided public authorities have the 
needed skills and willingness to operate, they should more easily redirect funds to more successful 
innovation processes when these funds are provided in the form of equity than when they are provided 
in the form of conventional subsidies or loans. 
(c) Type of innovating entity to receive this kind of support 
The public administration may, in principle, acquire part of the equity of both big and small innovating 
firms. However, when these firms are of a small size, their market value is intimately associated with 
the success of the innovation process to be publicly financed. Then, by acquiring shares of these 
entities, the public sector would be able to profit from the success of the innovation publicly funded. 
The profitability of public equity investments in large stand-alone project companies created to 
undertake the targeted innovation is also intimately linked to the success of this innovation. 
As already explained in paragraph (a) of this section, loans may be a suitable alternative to equity 
investments in large innovating entities regarding their ability to trigger innovation activity. However, 
this is not the case for small innovating entities that can be financially stressed by loans. 
Main conclusion 
Publicly owned equity is suitable to finance innovation that is subject to a high risk of not reaching the 
market (early research, development or demonstration activity) but may also render high market 
revenues. Both equity investments in small and big entities are possible, though the former are likely 
to be more abundant than the latter. Given the limited financial resources available to authorities, 
public contributions to the equity of innovating firms should be reduced in scope and size. Thus, 
innovation being financed with publicly owned equity should not be capital-intensive if public equity 
contributions represent a major source of funds. Alternatively, public equity can marginally finance 
large innovation project companies, acting as a signal of the potential and quality of the concerned 
innovation process. Equity can be bought both by MS and EU institutions. 
6.2.3 Prizes awarded to the winner of a contest 
(a) Ability of this instrument to fund innovation at a reasonable cost 
» Size of the financing gap it is able to cover: Prizes are a form of subsidy that places the technical and 
economic risks of RD&D activities on the innovator since the provision of public funds is contingent 
on the success of the innovation undertaken (see also Newell, 2007). Hence, conventional subsidies 
are preferred by innovators over prizes of the same size. In other words, prizes offered to undertake an 
innovation must be significantly larger than the unconditional subsidies that would suffice to 
undertake it. This implies that prizes offered to undertake costly processes would have to be very large 
in size. Besides, innovators involved in a contest that requires undertaking expensive innovation may Luis Olmos, Sophia Ruester, Siok Jen Liong, Jean-Michel Glachant 
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face liquidity problems, since they alone have to bear the up front cost of this activity. All this advises 
limiting the use of prizes to innovation whose cost is relatively low. 
» Public cost: Prizes are a form of subsidy. Therefore, their public cost must, in principle, be 
deemed high compared to that of loans or publicly owned equity. However, by rewarding outputs 
rather than inputs, prizes encourage the innovator to carry out its function efficiently, thus eliminating 
the risk of moral hazard behavior and increasing the probability of success, which ultimately reduces 
the public cost of supporting an innovation process. Besides, prizes normally result in contenders 
exploring several parallel research paths, which is highly advisable in innovation that is far from the 
market (involving significant risks and barriers to overcome) and could, alternatively, only be 
achieved by funding several research projects. Thus, using prizes to fund this kind of innovation may 
turn out to be economical. For prizes to efficiently trigger successful and useful innovation, they must 
be carefully designed based on the probability of success of this innovation, its cost and the number of 
contenders (see Newell and Wilson, 2005). 
(b) Targeting of technologies by this instrument  
» Ability to target a specific technical option: Given that this form of support rewards outputs, prizes 
avoid the need for public authorities to choose the specific technical option to support while at the 
same time being able to target the development of a specific technology. Prizes lead to the exploration 
of several research paths, while the same paths may be explored by various contenders (Newell and 
Nathan, 2005). Besides, innovators are not encouraged to hide any information from authorities on the 
relative merits of different technical options.  
» Flexibility in redirecting funds to alternative projects: Prizes only reward successful innovation. 
No commitment is made a priori on any specific process. Therefore, they do not run the risk of locking 
authorities into funding unpromising innovation activities. 
(c) Type of innovating entity to receive this kind of support  
Prizes create a smaller administrative burden for the innovator than other TP instruments, thus 
favoring the participation of small entities in contests. However, as already explained, small entities 
may be especially prone to have liquidity problems when facing high upfront cost innovation. 
Main conclusion 
Prizes may best fund low cost innovation undertaken during the first stages of development of the 
corresponding technologies, when the outcome of RD&D activities is highly uncertain. Prizes may be 
received either by small or larger companies and can be awarded both by national and European 
authorities. 
6.2.4 Tax credits and other benefits associated with innovation investments  
(a) Ability of this instrument to fund innovation at a reasonable cost 
» Size of the financing gap it is able to cover: Providing tax credits and other benefits associated with 
investments in RD&D may trigger a significant amount of additional clean innovation activity. 
Empirical data for the US discussed in Newell (2007) show that additional RD&D investments 
triggered by tax exemptions may be larger than the increase in innovation produced by an amount of 
conventional subsidies equal to the foregone tax revenue. According to Newell, the rate of additional 
clean innovation investment to private tax revenues may be as high as 1. In other words, on aggregate, 
all private revenues from tax exemptions would be reinvested in new innovation. Therefore, public 
financing innovation through tax exemptions would not be replacing private innovation funds but Public Support for the Financing of RD&D Activities in New Clean Energy Technologies 
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supplementing them (even taking into account that additional tax cuts would be obtained from further 
investments in innovation).  
However, under tax exemption schemes, the decision on which additional innovation to undertake 
is with incumbent innovating entities. These are the entities that can benefit from tax exemptions, 
since they are the ones already investing in innovation. Incumbent innovating entities (normally large 
companies) have traditionally shown a tendency to undertake close to the market processes that are 
able to render revenues in the short term. Thus, it is unlikely that private revenues from tax credits will 
fund a significant amount of new research and early stage development and demonstration. 
» Public cost: Tax credits are a subsidy of the size of the tax revenues foregone by the public 
administration. Their cost is deemed to be higher than that of public loans or publicly owned equity. 
However, as explained above, this type of instruments is less likely to crowd out private investments 
than conventional grants, since tax credits are granted on the condition of private investments in 
innovation already taking place. Therefore, the ratio of the total amount of investments in innovation 
triggered to the amount of public funds provided is deemed to be higher than that for conventional 
subsidies. In other words, the public cost of innovation triggered by tax credits is thought to be lower 
than the cost of innovation funded with conventional subsidies. 
(b) Targeting of technologies by this instrument  
» Ability to target a specific technical option: This type of support leaves the decision on which 
processes to finance in the hands of incumbent innovating entities. Tax credits create competition 
within each innovating company among the different innovation processes that can potentially be 
internally financed. Hence, targeting a technology or technical option through this instrument is not 
possible. Experience shows that, when left to decide, innovating entities tend to finance innovation 
that is close to the market (affecting mature technologies)
11.  
» Flexibility in redirecting funds to alternative projects: Given that innovating entities, instead of 
public authorities, are the ones deciding on the processes to finance, and assuming that private entities 
are more agile than the administration in redefining investment priorities, tax credits should be more 
flexible than conventional subsidies in targeting successful innovation. However, this may not be a 
priority if processes financed through tax credits belong, almost exclusively, to the last stages of the 
innovation chain. Tax credit policies should represent a credible long term commitment if they are to 
trigger a significant amount of additional private investments. 
(c) Type of innovating entity to receive this kind of support  
If structured as tax exemptions, this type of support can only be deemed an option for innovating 
entities paying a significant amount of taxes, i.e. large companies. If other benefits, like rebates, are 
provided, smaller innovating entities could probably benefit from them as well. In any case, these 
benefits are mainly effective to support innovation by medium to large innovating entities, since an 
entity must already be conducting innovation in order to get them. Large entities are best suited to 
undertake incremental innovation, though they can also undertake very expensive radical innovation 
within a collaborative financing scheme. However, in order for these companies to voluntarily 
contribute to large (i.e. costly) radical (i.e. very risky) innovation projects, further support measures 
beyond tax credits may probably need to be put in place. 
                                                      
11  In order to counter incentives to undertake close to the market innovation, authorities may consider the possibility of 
limiting the provision of tax revenues to a certain type of innovation. However, by directing the choice of processes to 
support, the public sector may end up picking winners, which is to be avoided. Luis Olmos, Sophia Ruester, Siok Jen Liong, Jean-Michel Glachant 
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Main conclusion 
Tax credits and other benefits associated with private innovation investments are best suited to finance 
close to the market, incremental innovation that would, nevertheless, not be undertaken in the absence 
of direct public support. These processes typically are undertaken by big entities. The application of 
tax credits is restricted to national authorities.  
6.2.5 Subsidies (grants, contracts)  
(a) Ability of this instrument to fund innovation at a reasonable cost 
»  Size of the financing gap it is able to cover: Grants and contracts directly (co-)financing an 
innovation process probably are the only type of public support capable of engaging innovating 
entities in expensive early research not undertaken under a cooperative scheme. If the award of grants 
or contracts does not affect the ownership of intellectual property resulting from innovation, these 
instruments are most profitable for innovators. In this case, subsidies reduce the fraction of the project 
costs born by the innovating entity, including upfront costs, while not reducing its revenues from this 
project. If the award of grants and contracts prevents the innovator from patenting the results of the 
subsidized innovation project, the profitability of this project for the private sector may get 
significantly reduced involving that a larger fraction of the cost of the project might have to be 
subsidized. If the level of a subsidy depends on the outcome of the project supported, its attractiveness 
to innovators may be reduced as well.  
» Public cost: Unconditional subsidies are the direct support instrument whose cost for the public 
sector is highest and which furthest erode the capacity of authorities to support further innovation. The 
provision of public funds to finance a process is not partially offset by any kind of compensation 
received by the public sector
12. Furthermore, grants and contracts may lead to moral hazard behavior 
once funds have been provided. Therefore, if possible, subsidies should be designed such that any 
waste of public money is avoided, which can be achieved by linking the provision of funds to the 
achievement of intermediate and final project objectives measured via Key Performance Indicators. 
This should lead to a step-wise provision of funds and the early termination of those projects that are 
unsuccessful.  
(b) Targeting of technologies by this instrument  
» Ability to target a specific technical option: Using subsidies, authorities are able to target any kind of 
innovation process, including those that are less commercially appealing. However, when subsidizing 
innovation, authorities must identify winning technologies (they must actually target a specific process 
or set of processes), which, as already explained above, may be a source of inefficiencies
13. 
Consequently, the use of subsidies to fund technologies that are able to compete with alternative clean 
options and, therefore, do not need to be targeted by public support, should be avoided. 
» Flexibility in redirecting funds to alternative projects: When a significant amount of public funds 
has already been invested in an innovation process, authorities may decide to continue supporting this 
process only to avoid the perception that they have wasted those funds already spent. Therefore, the 
                                                      
12  The case where authorities get some rights over the outcome of the innovation process is an exception. 
13  Given that authorities are normally not well suited to picking winners, the fact that they have to choose which processes 
to subsidize may lead to two types of undesirable effects. First, private investments may be crowded out if subsidies are 
provided to projects that would otherwise be financed by private parties. Second, due to the inability of authorities to 
precisely assess the social potential of innovation processes and encourage efficiency in their management, the share of 
failed innovation projects that are subsidized is likely to be higher than that for projects receiving other forms of public 
support. Public Support for the Financing of RD&D Activities in New Clean Energy Technologies 
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use of subsidies may lock authorities into supporting processes whose techno-economic results 
obtained thus far are not good.  
(c) Type of innovating entity to receive this kind of support  
In principle, grants and contracts can be granted to any type of innovating entity. 
Main conclusion 
Grants and contracts should only be awarded to innovation processes with a high potential social value 
which would otherwise not be carried out because they are not commercially appealing. This is the 
case of innovation involving clean energy technologies in the early stages of development, facing 
significant technical/regulatory barriers or producing benefits that can easily be appropriated by 
competitors of the innovator. However, a major part of clean energy innovation exhibits these features. 
Subsidies can be awarded both by national and European authorities. 
6.2.6 Notes on the combined use of TP instruments 
Public funds supporting an innovation process may be provided through several instruments. Thus, for 
example, publicly owned equity can mix well with loans to support the activity of small innovating 
entities. As explained in Section 6.2.2, equity can provide a small entity with the collateral it needs to 
get debt-based financing. However, we have also argued that financing innovation by small entities 
using a significant amount of loans may cause financial distress in these entities in the presence of a 
backlash in research.  
Other plausible combinations of instruments are that of loans with subsidies or that of publicly 
owned equity and subsidies. Public loans subject to interest rates that are below those offered in the 
market by well informed private lenders are in reality a combination of a loan and a subsidy. Publicly 
owned equity may be combined with subsidies to allow the public administration, and therefore 
society, to take a participation in revenues from innovation that needs to be subsidized. An in-depth 
analysis of these and other combinations of instruments will be provided in future research work. Luis Olmos, Sophia Ruester, Siok Jen Liong, Jean-Michel Glachant 
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Table 1: Summary of the characteristics of Technology Push instruments 
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7 Summary and conclusions 
Market Pull instruments are not able to completely correct the spillovers of benefits produced by 
clean energy technologies. Neither can they address all the existing barriers to the penetration of 
these technologies. Therefore, mobilizing public funds to support clean energy innovation is also 
necessary. Indirect and direct public support instruments are complementary means to trigger 
innovation. 
Public support provided should match the features of the innovation process addressed while 
maximizing social welfare. This determines the characteristics of financing policy instruments to 
be used. Instruments directly funding clean energy RD&D (i.e. Technology Push) should be able 
to engage innovators in those activities with the highest social value at the lowest possible public 
cost. When allocating public funds, authorities should achieve the right balance between the 
selection of the technologies to back and the creation of competition among them while being 
able to easily redirect funds to other technologies whenever necessary. Lastly, Technology Push 
instruments should be well adapted to the type of entity that is likely to conduct the innovation 
concerned. 
Awarding contracts and grants before innovation is undertaken may be necessary to engage 
private entities in expensive research that is socially valuable but whose commercial appeal is 
very low. If the targeted innovation is far from the market but relatively inexpensive, output-
driven direct support in the form of prizes can provide adequate investment incentives. Early 
inexpensive research can also be supported through publicly owned equity investments when it is 
to be conducted by small entities or project companies. Meanwhile, public loans or loan 
guarantees could support this type of research if it is to be conducted by large companies and the 
public sector is very important in the relevant research area or if the liquidity of the capital market 
is low. Public loans can also fund close to the market innovation (both capital-intensive and not) 
in the aforementioned conditions. Finally, close to the market innovation in areas where well 
established big firms are very active is best supported through tax credits or other benefits 
associated with private RD&D investments. 
Figure 2 summarizes the selection of both Market Pull and Technology Push instruments 
according to the methodology presented in this paper. Luis Olmos, Sophia Ruester, Siok Jen Liong, Jean-Michel Glachant 
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